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Abstract: A simple algebraic model of a property structure leading to the Leontief-type input-
output scheme is developed and used to eliminate indirect ownership relations and evaluate the
final distribution of national property among individual owners. Concepts of "family capitalism"
and "capitalism of agents" type of corporate governance are defined and compared. Implications
of different designs of corporate governance for general equilibrium theory, profit distribution
and decision making are discussed.
JEL Classification: C60, L33, K11
Keywords: Corporate governance, Leontief input-output model, ownership structure, primary
owners, principal-agent problem, secondary owners
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the Czech Government Research Target Programme, project
No. MSM0021620841. The author is grateful for valuable comments of two anonymous
reviewers.
                                                          
     
* Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Opletalova
26, 110 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic,  e-mail: turnovec@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz.3
1. Introduction
One of the basic paradigms of neo-classical economics reflected in general equilibrium
theory and welfare economics is an assumption about economic organization of the society based
on private ownership of production factors and services and their use to maximize "selfish"
benefits of owners. Individuals as consumers are maximizing utility subject to budget constraint
having on the right hand side incomes from selling production factors and services owned by
them and the revenues from profits of firms they are co-owning, firms are maximizing profits
and invisible hand of competition leads to Pareto optimal equilibrium states [e.g. Arrow (1951),
Debreu (1959), Feldman (1989)]. One can call such an ideal picture a "family capitalism";
everything is owned by households and there are no indirect ownership relations.
Facing reality one can observe a significantly different picture: a universe of corporations
and non-transparent networks of ownership relations. Citizens are owners of a fraction of shares,
but the ownership is dominated by big anonymous companies, banks and funds, co-owning a
significant part of national property on institutional basis. A citizen A has a share in corporation
B, corporation B has a share in corporation C, corporation C has a share in corporation D, and
corporation D has a share in corporation B. Is there some relation between citizen A and
corporation D? One can call such a structure a "capitalism of agents".
The legitimate question is: can an anonymous institution as an institution own anything?
Because of transaction costs modern economy cannot be governed by individual owners directly.
Thus the system of agents had been developed consisting of intermediary institutions and their
professional management, mostly distinct from owners. But, in principle, intermediary
institutions are only authorised to execute some of the property rights as agents and on behalf4
and for benefit of individual owners. The final owners of national property can be only
individuals or their non-profit associations.
1
Accepting this point of view one can ask a rather technical question: In non-transparent
networks of ownership relations is there a possibility to disclose a final assignment of the whole
national property to individual owners only? Can we decompose the ownership structure of
"capitalism of agents" to a "family capitalism" structure? In the paper we are trying to answer
this question, amending an earlier model of direct and indirect property rights which worked
under the assumption of “transparency” defined as absence of cross-ownership relations
[Turnovec (1999)].
A simple algebraic model of ownership structures is formulated reflecting direct and
indirect ownership relations
2 independently on cross-ownership and leading to a well known
Leontief input-output scheme [Leontief (1996)]. The first draft of this paper was presented at the
European Public Choice Society 2002 Annual Meeting in Italy [Turnovec (2002)] To the
author’s best knowledge presented application of Leontief input-output model has not been
discussed and published earlier.
                                                          
     
1 "Property rights are of course human rights, i.e., rights which are possessed by human beings. The
introduction of the wholly false distinction between property rights and human rights in many policy discussions is
surely one of the all-time great semantic flimflams". [Jensen and Meckling (1976: p. 307)].
     
2 Speaking about direct relation we have in mind relation between individual A and company B
providing that individual A owns a share in company B, while indirect relation means that individual A, having a
share in company B and not having a share in company C, has through company B a relation to company C that
is co-owned by company B.5
2. Leontief-type model of ownership structures
Let us consider two types of economic agents: the primary owners, who can own, but
cannot be owned (citizens, citizens' non-profit associations, state, municipalities, etc.), and the
secondary owners, who can be owned, and at the same time, can own (companies, corporations).
Let
m be the number of primary owners,  m i ,..., 2 , 1 = ,
n be the number of secondary owners (companies),  n j ,..., 2 , 1 = ,
ji s be the direct share of the primary owner i in the secondary owner j (as a
proportion of total number of shares),
jk t be the direct share of the secondary owner (company) k in the secondary owner
(company) k ,
ji x be the full (direct and indirect) share of the primary owner i in the secondary
owner  j ,
ji y be the indirect share of the primary owner iin the secondary owner  j .
Then the  m n× matrix
where the row j expresses shares of the primary owners  m i ,..., 2 , 1 = in the secondary owner  j ,
and the column iexpresses the shares of the primary owner iin the secondary owners
n j ,..., 2 , 1 = , provides a primary property distribution, and the  n n× matrix
where the row j expresses shares of the secondary owners  n k ,..., 2 , 1 = in the secondary owner
j , and the column k expresses shares of secondary owner k in the secondary owners
) ( ji s =   S ,
) ( jk t =   T ,6
n j ,..., 2 , 1 =  provides a secondary property distribution. The couple () T S,  characterises an













for any  n j ,..., 2 , 1 = .
Matrices S and T are observable. The question is: is it possible to derive unobservable
matrices
and
( ) ji x = X
of indirect and full shares of primary owners in secondary owners?
It must hold
and
(where ki jkx t is the part of the full property share ki x of a primary owneri in a companyk which
follows from the share  jk t of company k in company j ). In matrix form we have
and
( ) ji y = Y
Y S   X     =   +
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Assuming, that the matrix() T I − , where I is an identity matrix, is a non-singular Leontief
matrix (i.e., all elements of T are non-negative and some of its norms is less than 1), then there
exists a non-negative inverse matrix ()
1 − −T I and we can express X as
The last expression is nothing else but Leontief input-output scheme that gives X as a function of
T and S. We are able to eliminate indirect relations and to find a final assignment of the total
property to the primary owners only.
If  n n× = 0 T , where  n n× 0 is  n n×  zero matrix, we can speak about the "family capitalism"
structure, if T is a non-zero matrix, we can speak about "capitalism of agents" structure. We are
living in the world of corporate stakeholders (the capitalism of agents). In the latter case the
corporate governance (decision making rights and profit shares of stakeholders) can be based on
matrices S and T, but it is theoretically possible (while, perhaps, not very practical) to simulate
the "family capitalism" governance based on the matrix X.
3. An illustrative example
Let us consider a hypothetical initial ownership structure with the four primary owners
P1, P2, P3, P4 and the three companies C1, C2, C3 (secondary owners), described in Table 1.
Table 1
Matrix S Matrix T
P1 P2 P3 P4 C1 C2 C3 total
C1 0 . 3 0 . 2 0000 . 5 01
C2 0.3 0 0.3 0.2 0 0 0.2 1
C3 00000 . 6 0 . 4 01
In this case
() .   -
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and
Matrices S and T provide an observable property distribution.
Let us use our model. In our particular case
and
Then
which gives the final distribution of shares and voting rights of primary owners in corporations
(secondary owners) after elimination of indirect links (i.e., "family capitalism" type of corporate
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governance in "capitalism of agents" ownership structure from Table 1). For example, this
arrangement shows the decision making rights of the primary owners in corporation C3 which is
fully owned by corporations C1 and C2.
To illustrate the difference in the distribution of profits in "capitalism of agents" and
"family capitalism" type of corporate governance, let us assume that profits of corporations C1,
C2 and C3 are 100 in all three cases:
Then in "capitalism of agents" the profits will be distributed among all seven actors:
i.e., 60 for P1, 20 for P2, 30 for P3, 20 for P4, 60 for C1, 90 for C2 and 20 for C3. In "family
capitalism" type of governance the profits will be distributed only among the primary owners:
i.e., 133.9535 for P1, 38.13953 for P2, 76.74419 for P3  and 51.16279 for P4.
4. Some implications
There can be a significant difference between a primary "face" image of the ownership
structure and a "true" position of the subjects of property rights. This difference as a difference
between "family capitalism" and "capitalism of agents" types of corporate governance has
serious theoretical implications.
() .   100 100 100     =   π
() ( )
() ,   20 90 60 20 30 20 60
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a) How are and should the profits be distributed? We established that the final allocation
of property to the individual property owners, after elimination of indirect relations,
while, in reality, only listed direct initial distribution S is taken into account.
b) What are the implications for voting power in the corporate governance? [See, e.g.
Maeland (1991), Gambarelli (1994), Gambarelli and Owen (1994)]. How should be allocated the
voting weights of different actors in corporate decision making: directly according to X or
indirectly according to S?
3
c) Another issue for theoretical research is an implication of corporate governance design
for general equilibrium and welfare theory. Indirect ownership relations reflected in "capitalism
of agents" corporate governance clearly generate externalities in the profit maximisation doctrine
of general equilibrium theory: total profit of one company might depend (through redistribution
of profits among institutional owners) on profits of other companies.
Many problems associated with the inadequacy of the current general equilibrium theory
and welfare economics can be related to the theory of agency relationships (principal-agent
problem). An agency relationship is a contract under which one or more persons (the
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf. This
involves delegation of some decision making authority to the agent and presupposes some
incentive scheme for the agent to maximise the welfare of the principal. Agency relations have
been intensively investigated on the level of the firm [e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. But
here we face the economy level principal-agent problem. Indirect ownership relations, generally
                                                          
     
3 An agenda for future research is to apply the methodology developed here to the control structures
that are given not only by direct shares, but by hierarchical relations in networks of principals and agents.
Extension of voting models and power indices methodology for such structures could bring new ideas also into
studies of political behaviour.
() S T I X
1 − − = ,11
viewed as full ownership relations, are frequently agency relations. We are living in economy of
agents behaving as owners. There is a hierarchical structure of agents in economy. Primary
owners are principals and secondary institutional owners are in many cases just labels for agents.
But in the network of indirect ownership relations an agent A becomes a principal with respect to
some other agent B, the agent B becomes a principal with respect to some agent C, and C can
become a principal with respect to A, principal of his principals. The principal-agent ownership
relation is not transitive and it is not always clear who is an agent and who is his principal. Such
situation can be considered a market imperfection and can lead to market failures.
4
It is interesting that one of the major differences between the USA, on the one hand, and
Germany and Japan, on the other, is in the role of corporations as each other's shareholders. In
the USA it is rare that one corporation owns large blocks of shares in other companies; in some
situations this is even forbidden by law. This is not so in Germany and Japan where high
proportions of company shares are held by other corporations [Marer (2000)].
A hierarchical principal-agent problem and corporate governance design within the
framework of general equilibrium theory and welfare economics is a challenge for economic
theory.
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